Inability to speak at a planning committee meeting and prejudice

The Court of Appeal has handed down judgment in R (Moakes) v Canterbury City Council and Mr Walters [2025] EWCA Civ 927, dismissing the appeal and upholding the judgment of HHJ Alice Robinson. The case concerned an application for major development in the Kent Downs AONB (now, National Landscape), comprising warehouses and a winery to be occupied by Chapel Down Wine. Natural England; the AONB Unit and CPRE Kent objected to the development. In breach of its constitution, the Council refused to allow representatives of Natural England or CPRE Kent to speak at the committee meeting on behalf of those organisations.

The High Court dismissed the application for judicial review. In the Court of Appeal the Appellant alleged that the Judge erred in finding that:

a) the Appellant had suffered no prejudice as a result of the inability of CPRE Kent (of which she was a member) or Natural England to speak at the committee meeting;

b) the Council was not required to expressly explain why it had rejected the advice of Natural England and the AONB Unit on certain matters; and

c) the Council was not obliged to provide reasons for departing from a previous finding by a different Inspector that expansion of the wine industry was not a national priority justifying major development in the AONB.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal on all grounds. The judgment is of interest in confirming that whether prejudice arises from an inability to speak is a question of fact to be reviewed on appeal in accordance with the principles articulated in Smech Properties Ltd v Runnymede Borough Council and Others [2016] EWCA Civ 42. Cases such as R v Broxtowe BC ex parte Bradford [2000] IRLR 326, where the subject of the decision in question has been deprived of an opportunity to speak are unlikely to provide assistance in the planning context; and the judgment of Dove J in R (Kelly) v London Borough of Hounslow [2010] EWHC 1256 (Admin) is not authority for the proposition that the loss of an opportunity to persuade a committee through oral representations amounts to prejudice.

On Ground 2, the Court confirmed that there is no heightened standards of reasoning required where the decision-maker departs from views of statutory consultees. References to the need for “cogent and compelling” reasons for disagreeing with statutory consultees is no more than a short-hand for the standard of reasoning set out in South Bucks District Council and another v Porter (No.2) [2004] 1 WLR 1953. The judgment of Sir Duncan Ouseley in Watton v Cornwall Council [2023] EWHC 2436 does not establish a principle that express reasons for disagreeing with the views of a statutory consultee must always be provided.

On Ground 3, the previous finding that expansion of the wine industry was not a national priority was a rejection of the specific evidence provided in that case and not a statement of general principle. There was no material inconsistency with the finding in the present case that the wine industry was nationally important and no need to provide reasons for disagreeing with the previous appeal.

A copy of the judgment can be found here.

Isabella Tafur is a barrister at Francis Taylor Building. Instructed by Maples Teesdale LLP, she acted for the interested party developer in the High Court and Court of Appeal.